Other depository credit intermediation
This Canadian industry comprises establishments, not classified to any other Canadian industry, primarily engaged in accepting deposits and making loans. — Statistics Canada, NAICS 2022A
- Establishments · CanadaA
- 128
- Under 10 employeesA
- 99%
- Establishments · USA
- 37
- Employment · USA
- 2,087
- Payroll · USA
- $285M
Size and shape
How many businesses there are and how small they are. Fragmentation is the first thing an entrant — or anyone selling software into this industry — needs to know, and it is one of the few things that is actually measured.
Canadian establishments by number of employeesA
Of 128 Canadian establishments with employees, 99% have fewer than ten — an industry of very small operators.
Where they areA
Largest four provinces by establishment count. Establishments with employees only — sole operators with no payroll are not in this table, so in trades and personal services the true number of businesses is higher.
Measured, not forecast: the share of US establishments opening in one year that were still active later. It counts good operators and bad ones together, which is exactly why it is the honest answer to “what are the odds”. It is for the whole sector rather than this market, and the ten-year figure comes from an older cohort because no younger one has reached ten years.
How businesses here compete
The structural profile of subsector 522, which every industry beneath it inherits. This is analyst judgment from how the subsector is organised — not research into this industry, and not a measurement.
Deposit-taking requires a charter. Non-bank lending and brokerage are the reachable end, and they depend on funding lines from the institutions they compete with.
- Who sets the price
- Interest-rate markets and prudential regulators.
- The software it runs on
- Core banking, loan origination and servicing, compliance.
Market screens and studies
Market-entry records filed along this branch of the hierarchy. A record at or beneath this code is about this industry; one above it is about something wider that contains it.
Screened one level up. Nothing is filed at this exact code; the screen for 5221 Depository credit intermediation covers it.
A core replacement is the single riskiest project a bank undertakes — ledger, deposits, payments and regulatory reporting move at once — so cores are replaced roughly once a generation. The incumbents' position rests on that, not on product quality. The modern challengers (Mambu, Thought Machine, 10x) have each raised hundreds of millions and are still fighting for reference customers a decade in.
The asset in this category is a shared data network, not the software, and the people who own the largest networks are buying the vendors. FICO's FY2025 10-K says its fraud models are trained on transaction data from more than 10,000 institutions in the FICO Falcon Intelligence Network [A]. Riskified's FY2025 20-F reports $155.1B of ecommerce orders reviewed, about 2.5% of global ecommerce by its own calculation [A]. That is what an entrant cannot copy. A new model on day one has seen no fraud, and the buyer is paying for what the model has seen. The exits tell the same story. Visa bought Featurespace in December 2024 for $946M (Visa FY2025 10-K) [A]. Mastercard's FY2025 10-K describes Recorded Future as part of its fraud and cyber offering [A]. Entrust bought Onfido in April 2024, and onfido.com now redirects to entrust.com [B]. Permira took majority control of BioCatch at a $1.3B valuation in September 2024 [B]. Socure bought Effectiv for about $136M in late 2024 [B]. In each case the buyer already owned traffic, a payment network or a bureau. The listed pure-plays are not growing fast. NICE's Financial Crime and Compliance segment, which is mostly Actimize, earned $485.4M in 2025, up 7.0% [A]. FICO's whole Software segment earned $822.3M, up 3%, with software ARR up 4% [A]. FICO does not break out fraud revenue. Riskified earned $344.6M, up 5.2%, with a net loss of $27.6M [A]. Mitek earned $179.7M, up 4% [A]. Meanwhile the bureaus get bigger. RELX's Risk segment, which includes LexisNexis Risk Solutions, earned £3,485M in 2025 with 8% underlying growth. RELX names "digital Fraud & Identity" as one of the drivers [A]. How this differs from the neighbouring records. The regtech and compliance automation record (5223) covers AML transaction monitoring, sanctions and KYC case management, a budget the bank spends because a regulator requires it. This record covers the loss budget: card and payment fraud, account takeover, application fraud, identity proofing at onboarding, and chargebacks. The two overlap at NICE, Feedzai and Sardine, which sell both. The core banking record (5221) is the ledger these tools plug into. The embedded payments record (522390) is the rail whose risk this software scores. The wider sector is mapped on the fintech topic page. The 5221 anchor (depository credit intermediation) is the anchor buyer. The same software is sold to payments companies and processors (522320), consumer lenders (5222), e-commerce retailers and marketplaces (4541, 459), and gig and crypto platforms. Incumbent vulnerability decides it. The large data networks are owned by companies whose main business is elsewhere, and they treat fraud scoring as a feature of the network. That leaves an independent to sell either to a long tail of fintechs that have little data of their own, or to be acquired by one of those companies.
Software serving this industry
The vertical software markets filed along the same branch — who sells to these businesses and who they would have to displace — and then the generic categories every business buys whatever it does.
Sold across the wider branch
A core replacement is the single riskiest project a bank undertakes — ledger, deposits, payments and regulatory reporting move at once — so cores are replaced roughly once a generation. The incumbents' position rests on that, not on product quality. The modern challengers (Mambu, Thought Machine, 10x) have each raised hundreds of millions and are still fighting for reference customers a decade in.
The asset in this category is a shared data network, not the software, and the people who own the largest networks are buying the vendors. FICO's FY2025 10-K says its fraud models are trained on transaction data from more than 10,000 institutions in the FICO Falcon Intelligence Network [A]. Riskified's FY2025 20-F reports $155.1B of ecommerce orders reviewed, about 2.5% of global ecommerce by its own calculation [A]. That is what an entrant cannot copy. A new model on day one has seen no fraud, and the buyer is paying for what the model has seen. The exits tell the same story. Visa bought Featurespace in December 2024 for $946M (Visa FY2025 10-K) [A]. Mastercard's FY2025 10-K describes Recorded Future as part of its fraud and cyber offering [A]. Entrust bought Onfido in April 2024, and onfido.com now redirects to entrust.com [B]. Permira took majority control of BioCatch at a $1.3B valuation in September 2024 [B]. Socure bought Effectiv for about $136M in late 2024 [B]. In each case the buyer already owned traffic, a payment network or a bureau. The listed pure-plays are not growing fast. NICE's Financial Crime and Compliance segment, which is mostly Actimize, earned $485.4M in 2025, up 7.0% [A]. FICO's whole Software segment earned $822.3M, up 3%, with software ARR up 4% [A]. FICO does not break out fraud revenue. Riskified earned $344.6M, up 5.2%, with a net loss of $27.6M [A]. Mitek earned $179.7M, up 4% [A]. Meanwhile the bureaus get bigger. RELX's Risk segment, which includes LexisNexis Risk Solutions, earned £3,485M in 2025 with 8% underlying growth. RELX names "digital Fraud & Identity" as one of the drivers [A]. How this differs from the neighbouring records. The regtech and compliance automation record (5223) covers AML transaction monitoring, sanctions and KYC case management, a budget the bank spends because a regulator requires it. This record covers the loss budget: card and payment fraud, account takeover, application fraud, identity proofing at onboarding, and chargebacks. The two overlap at NICE, Feedzai and Sardine, which sell both. The core banking record (5221) is the ledger these tools plug into. The embedded payments record (522390) is the rail whose risk this software scores. The wider sector is mapped on the fintech topic page. The 5221 anchor (depository credit intermediation) is the anchor buyer. The same software is sold to payments companies and processors (522320), consumer lenders (5222), e-commerce retailers and marketplaces (4541, 459), and gig and crypto platforms. Incumbent vulnerability decides it. The large data networks are owned by companies whose main business is elsewhere, and they treat fraud scoring as a feature of the network. That leaves an independent to sell either to a long tail of fintechs that have little data of their own, or to be acquired by one of those companies.
And what every business buys · 33 generic categories
Sold to every industry rather than this one, so they are filed against the software industry's own code. The same few vendors recur across most of them.
Who works here
The occupations employed in Finance and insurance, most concentrated in it first. The share is measured against the whole sector, not this industry — the published cross-tabulation stops there.
Concentrated in this sectorA
These jobs are mostly done here. An operator in this industry is competing for them against others in the same industry, not against the whole economy.
And the jobs every business has
Found across at least fourteen of the twenty sectors. But note the shape of this industry: 99% of establishments have fewer than ten employees, and at that size most of these roles are one person wearing several hats, or bought in from outside.