Finance and insurance
This sector comprises establishments primarily engaged in financial transactions (that is, transactions involving the creation, liquidation, or change in ownership of financial assets) or in facilitating financial transactions. — Statistics Canada, NAICS 2022A
- Establishments · CanadaA
- 41,611
- Under 10 employeesA
- 66%
- Establishments · USA
- 480,546
- Employment · USA
- 6,831,897
- Payroll · USA
- $845.1B
Size and shape
How many businesses there are and how small they are. Fragmentation is the first thing an entrant — or anyone selling software into this industry — needs to know, and it is one of the few things that is actually measured.
Canadian establishments by number of employeesA
Of 41,611 Canadian establishments with employees, 66% have fewer than ten — mostly small operators.
Where they areA
Largest four provinces by establishment count. Establishments with employees only — sole operators with no payroll are not in this table, so in trades and personal services the true number of businesses is higher.
Measured, not forecast: the share of US establishments opening in one year that were still active later. It counts good operators and bad ones together, which is exactly why it is the honest answer to “what are the odds”. It is for the whole sector rather than this market, and the ten-year figure comes from an older cohort because no younger one has reached ten years.
Market screens and studies
Market-entry records filed along this branch of the hierarchy. A record at or beneath this code is about this industry; one above it is about something wider that contains it.
There is nothing to enter here. The Bank of Canada exists under its own Act of Parliament, and the five Canadian establishments in this code are its head office and regional offices, not five competitors [A]. The honest screen is that this is a buyer, not a market, and the useful question is what it buys. Its 2025 financial statements answer with unusual clarity. The Bank ran on $740M of operating expenditures: $416M of staff costs, $115M of technology and telecommunications, $80M of depreciation, $42M of premises and $36M of bank note research, production and processing [A], against $124.3B of notes in circulation. So the addressable spend is one technology line of $115M and a bank note budget that swings with the production cycle — $10M in 2024, $36M in 2025 [A]. Both are reachable only through federal-style procurement with security clearance, long qualification and, for notes, a specialist secure-printing industry with very few qualified suppliers. A new vendor can win work here, but as an extension of an existing security, data or research business that already holds the clearances — not as a reason to start one. One institution with one procurement office is a customer concentration of 100%. Note also what this is not: a profit pool. The Bank recorded a net loss of $82M in 2025 after $3,079M in 2024 [A], the residue of interest paid on settlement balances, which has nothing to do with suppliers. Payment systems, clearing and settlement sit elsewhere in sector 52 and are not covered by this record.
A crypto platform looks like an exchange with a fatter margin, and the largest listed operator shows both halves of that. Coinbase took $7,181.3M of revenue in 2025 [A], but its fee lines move with coin prices: in Q3 2026 transaction revenue fell 44% to $590.2M as consumer spot volume fell 59%, and staking rewards fell 54% to $85.7M [A]. The steadier line is interest on customers' stablecoin balances ($306.9M in the quarter), and that goes to whoever already holds the balances. The cut is what has to be paid for before the first trade. In Canada a platform must register as an investment dealer and join CIRO (the CSA has ended the interim restricted-dealer route). In the EU it needs MiCA authorisation, and in the US money-transmitter licences plus New York's BitLicense. On top of that, it has to keep customers' coins safe from state-backed thieves. On 29 October 2026 about $6.36B left Binance's wallets, most of it in about 20 minutes [B]. The FBI blamed North Korea, and Binance said it would absorb the loss from company funds, its SAFU reserve and its futures insurance fund. Only a balance sheet that size survives a loss like that. Smaller victims did not get through intact: Mt. Gox's trustee is still repaying creditors, with the deadline now 31 October 2027 [A]; Coincheck was sold to Monex; and WazirX reopened only after a Singapore restructuring. Coinbase's own 10-K says customer assets 'are substantially more than our corporate assets and available insurance' [A]. So the sunk cost is regulatory capital plus a balance sheet able to absorb a tail loss, and licensed platforms change hands cheaply by comparison: Robinhood paid about $224M for Bitstamp and $178M for WonderFi [A]. An entrant can buy a licence for less than it costs to build one, but it still carries the tail risk. Conventional exchanges are covered in 5232-securities-exchange-operation.
An exchange looks like the purest toll road in finance, and TMX Group's 2025 shows why people want one: revenue of $1,717.2M, up 18%, with income from operations of $771.0M [A] — a 45% operating margin on a business that holds no inventory and takes no market risk. Recognition by a securities commission is a real hurdle, but it has been cleared in Canada more than once, so it is not the cut. The cut is that the incumbent is not vulnerable where the money is. Of TMX's revenue, equities and fixed-income trading and clearing — the only part a new marketplace actually contests — was $283.4M, about 17% [A]. The rest is capital formation ($297.4M), derivatives trading and clearing ($434.5M) and data, indices and analytics ($701.8M) [A]: lines that belong to whoever already has the issuers, the clearing house and the tape. A challenger venue can win matching share by cutting fees to near zero, and in doing so earns near zero, while order flow returns to the deepest book whenever spreads matter. Liquidity is the product, and only incumbency manufactures it. The 65 Canadian establishments are mostly one-to-four-person entities — holding shells, commodity and niche venues, representative offices — around a single 500-plus employer. The software sold to this industry is screened separately at 5231 and 5239.
Brokerage books are bought by consolidators using cheap acquisition debt and carrier contingent commissions an individual buyer does not earn, which sets a price a first-time acquirer cannot match without overpaying. Carrier appointments and provincial licensing gate entry, and the retiring-broker succession wave that makes this look accessible is the same wave the consolidators are systematically working. The agency management software at this code is studied separately.
This code counts pools of money, not businesses. A pension fund exists because an employer or a government sponsors a plan; nobody founds one to compete for customers, and its members are assigned by their employment rather than won. The honest screen is that this is a buyer, not a market to enter, and the addressable market for an entrant as a pension fund is nil — which is why the cut is market size even though the pools are vast. Statistics Canada put trusteed pension assets at $2.6 trillion at the end of 2025, up 6.2%, with public-sector plans holding $2.1 trillion — 82.4% of the total — against $460.6 billion in private-sector plans [A]. That concentration is the second finding. The establishment count bears it out: 70 employers, of which 17 have 200 or more staff — the large public plans that run investment teams in-house — while private-sector plan assets grew only 1.5% in the year. So even what is sold to these funds (asset management mandates, custody, actuarial and administration services) faces a small number of very large buyers who increasingly do the work themselves, and a long tail of private plans that is barely growing. Those supplier markets are the ones to screen; the fund-administration software sold into this branch is screened separately at 526.
A fund is a legal vehicle, so the enterable proposition here is the act of launching one — registering as an investment fund manager, filing a prospectus and seeding a mutual fund or ETF. Read that way the category is enormous and growing: SIMA reported mutual fund assets of $2.797 trillion and ETF assets of $924.2 billion at the end of August 2026, both all-time highs [A]. The vehicle is also cheap to create relative to that pool; trustees, custodians and administrators are all for hire, which is the point of the 526 fund-administration record nearby. The cut is who decides which funds a saver is shown. A fund does not sell itself: it is placed by an adviser from a dealer's approved shelf, or picked by a self-directed investor from a screen sorted by size, fee and track record — and a new fund has none of the three. The flow figures show where the marginal dollar goes: ETF net sales of $15.5 billion in August against $4.7 billion for mutual funds [A], into a format where the product is an index somebody else publishes, the fee is the only variable left, and the winners are the issuers with the scale to live on it. The 681 establishments, 508 of them with one to four employees, are mostly the vehicles themselves and small managers running private pools — real businesses, but built on a client book the founder already had, not on a product launched cold.
Software serving this industry
The vertical software markets filed along the same branch — who sells to these businesses and who they would have to displace — and then the generic categories every business buys whatever it does.
A core replacement is the single riskiest project a bank undertakes — ledger, deposits, payments and regulatory reporting move at once — so cores are replaced roughly once a generation. The incumbents' position rests on that, not on product quality. The modern challengers (Mambu, Thought Machine, 10x) have each raised hundreds of millions and are still fighting for reference customers a decade in.
The asset in this category is a shared data network, not the software, and the people who own the largest networks are buying the vendors. FICO's FY2025 10-K says its fraud models are trained on transaction data from more than 10,000 institutions in the FICO Falcon Intelligence Network [A]. Riskified's FY2025 20-F reports $155.1B of ecommerce orders reviewed, about 2.5% of global ecommerce by its own calculation [A]. That is what an entrant cannot copy. A new model on day one has seen no fraud, and the buyer is paying for what the model has seen. The exits tell the same story. Visa bought Featurespace in December 2024 for $946M (Visa FY2025 10-K) [A]. Mastercard's FY2025 10-K describes Recorded Future as part of its fraud and cyber offering [A]. Entrust bought Onfido in April 2024, and onfido.com now redirects to entrust.com [B]. Permira took majority control of BioCatch at a $1.3B valuation in September 2024 [B]. Socure bought Effectiv for about $136M in late 2024 [B]. In each case the buyer already owned traffic, a payment network or a bureau. The listed pure-plays are not growing fast. NICE's Financial Crime and Compliance segment, which is mostly Actimize, earned $485.4M in 2025, up 7.0% [A]. FICO's whole Software segment earned $822.3M, up 3%, with software ARR up 4% [A]. FICO does not break out fraud revenue. Riskified earned $344.6M, up 5.2%, with a net loss of $27.6M [A]. Mitek earned $179.7M, up 4% [A]. Meanwhile the bureaus get bigger. RELX's Risk segment, which includes LexisNexis Risk Solutions, earned £3,485M in 2025 with 8% underlying growth. RELX names "digital Fraud & Identity" as one of the drivers [A]. How this differs from the neighbouring records. The regtech and compliance automation record (5223) covers AML transaction monitoring, sanctions and KYC case management, a budget the bank spends because a regulator requires it. This record covers the loss budget: card and payment fraud, account takeover, application fraud, identity proofing at onboarding, and chargebacks. The two overlap at NICE, Feedzai and Sardine, which sell both. The core banking record (5221) is the ledger these tools plug into. The embedded payments record (522390) is the rail whose risk this software scores. The wider sector is mapped on the fintech topic page. The 5221 anchor (depository credit intermediation) is the anchor buyer. The same software is sold to payments companies and processors (522320), consumer lenders (5222), e-commerce retailers and marketplaces (4541, 459), and gig and crypto platforms. Incumbent vulnerability decides it. The large data networks are owned by companies whose main business is elsewhere, and they treat fraud scoring as a feature of the network. That leaves an independent to sell either to a long tail of fintechs that have little data of their own, or to be acquired by one of those companies.
Two systems of record share the bank and credit-union desk, and the decision engine underneath belongs to the score and bureau companies. nCino earned $594.8M in the year to 31 January 2026, up 10%, and reported its first GAAP profit ($5.2M) after fourteen years [A]. It ended the year with over 2,700 customers, about 1,500 of them depository institutions, and 114 paying more than $1M a year [A]. Its strength is commercial and small-business credit at banks; mortgage is a separate $79.6M US line [A]. MeridianLink is the consumer and credit-union side: it earned $316.3M in 2024, $249.3M of it from lending software, across about 2,000 institutions, and charges per application for personal, auto and card loans whether the application is approved or not [A]. Centerbridge took it private at $20.00 a share, about $2.39B of total funding including debt, and the NYSE delisting was filed on 24 October 2025 [A]. MeridianLink's own 10-K says its main competition in non-mortgage consumer origination is the bank's core provider (Fiserv, FIS, Jack Henry, Temenos), then nCino and Q2, then CU Direct's Origence and Sync1 [A]. Q2's 10-K names Abrigo, Baker Hill, nCino, Finastra, Brilliance and Temenos against its lending products, and Q2 has only about 100 digital-lending customer accounts against $794.8M of total revenue [A]. The decision layer is held by FICO, whose 10-K names Experian, Equifax, Moody's, MeridianLink and CGI as its origination competitors [A], with Provenir, Taktile and Zest AI as the funded independents. The AI-underwriting entrant already exists and is well funded. Zest AI took $200M from Insight Partners in December 2024 and says nearly 300 lenders use it [B/C]. Upstart sells the same idea to banks and credit unions as a lending platform: $1.04B revenue in 2025, $11.0B of loans, 91% fully automated, over 100 lending partners [A]. Consolidation is the exit. Moody's absorbed Numerated (numerated.com now redirects to Moody's loan-origination page), Alkami paid about $375M for MANTL's account opening in March 2025 [A], nCino bought DocFox, FullCircl and Sandbox Banking [A], and Carlyle, Accel-KKR, Flexpoint Ford and Centerbridge own Abrigo, Baker Hill and MeridianLink. How this differs from the neighbouring records. The mortgage record (5222) is ICE's Encompass world: one-to-four-family loans, servicing and secondary marketing. This record covers everything else a lender books: personal, auto and card loans and small-business credit, plus deposit account opening and the credit decision engine. The core banking record (5221) is the ledger the LOS posts to, and the core vendor is the LOS's first competitor. The financial data and credit analytics record (5239) holds the bureaus and scores that feed the decision; the fraud and identity record (5221) covers application fraud and KYC, which origination vendors now bundle. The lenders themselves, including the 60 on CNBC's 2026 list, are on the fintech topic page. In Canada, Covaleyo (Valeyo and Covarity, merged April 2025) says ProLender is used by 30% of Canadian credit unions [C]; Lendesk's Finmo is mortgage-broker software and belongs with the mortgage record. Incumbent vulnerability decides it. An entrant has to beat the core provider's bundled LOS, then nCino or MeridianLink, then a model-risk review of any new credit model, and the two independent AI-underwriting vendors with real funding (Zest AI, Taktile) are already selling into that gap.
One vendor sits in the path of roughly nine in ten US mortgages and owns both origination and servicing after the Black Knight merger. The most credible challenger has been losing share for three years. Regulatory examination of the origination workflow adds a compliance floor on top. The interesting question in this market is antitrust, not entry.
Well-funded on both sides: entrenched incumbents inside bank procurement and a dense field of venture-backed challengers already competing for the same AML and sanctions-screening budgets. Note the Canadian precedent — Verafin (Killick Capital-backed, and present in this repo's angel dataset) proves the market rewards a winner, and also that the winner has already emerged.
What this category is. The biller's side of a household or business bill: presenting the bill (portal, email, text, PDF), taking the payment by card, ACH, wallet, phone, text, IVR or cash at a retailer, running autopay and payment plans, and posting the money back into the biller's own billing system. The 522320 code (financial transactions processing) is navigation only — the buyers are utilities, telecoms, insurers, hospitals, property managers, lenders, universities and every level of government, so this is cross-industry software rather than a vertical. Paymentus describes exactly that spread: billers 'across a variety of industry verticals, including utilities, financial services, insurance, government, telecommunications, real estate management, education, consumer finance, healthcare, business to business (B2B) and small business' [A, 10-K]. How it differs from the neighbouring records. Utility CIS and metering (2211) is the system of record that issues the bill; this record is the layer that collects it and plugs into that CIS. Embedded payments for vertical software (522390) is the infrastructure a software vendor rents to take payments inside its own product; EBPP vendors sell directly to the biller. Collections (561440) starts where this one stops: the bill is already late. Who holds it. Two public companies publish the numbers. Paymentus (NYSE: PAY; Charlotte) reported FY2025 revenue of $1,196.5M, up from $871.7M, on 724.0M transactions, up 21.3%, with net income of $66.9M and contribution profit of $386.3M; 98.4% of revenue came from the United States [A]. ACI Worldwide's Biller segment — Speedpay, which ACI bought from Western Union for $750M in cash in May 2019 [A, 8-K] — earned $817.7M of revenue in FY2025, up from $726.5M, at $140.7M of segment adjusted EBITDA [A]. Fiserv sells biller-direct, print and in-person cash payment (CheckFreePay, 'over 30,000 retail locations') to billers [C, own site] and CheckFree RXP to banks, whose customers pay billers from online banking [A, 10-K]; FIS sells BillerIQ, which its 2024 product sheet describes as 'a white labeled SaaS biller direct solution' [A, own product sheet]. Neither breaks out a revenue figure for the business. The field has just consolidated again. ACI's own 10-K lists its bill-payment competitors as 'Alacriti, FIS, Fiserv, InvoiceCloud, Kubra, One Inc., Paymentus, PayNearMe, Repay, as well as smaller vertical-specific providers' [A]. Since then REPAY (Nasdaq: RPAY) closed its purchase of KUBRA from Hearst on 1 June 2026 for about $372M in cash, funded partly by a new term loan [A, 8-K]; KUBRA added about $20.8M of revenue in its first month inside REPAY [A, 10-Q], and still tells visitors it reaches 'over 40% of households in the U.S. and Canada' [C]. InvoiceCloud went private inside EngageSmart when Vista Equity Partners bought EngageSmart for about $4.0B in January 2024 [B, Vista release]; the old engagesmart.com address now redirects to invoicecloud.net [A, observed]. On the B2B side, Billtrust (EQT, about $1.7B, December 2022 [B]) and Bottomline (Thoma Bravo, about $2.6B, May 2022 [A, the buyer's release]) were both taken private. One Inc, the insurance-premium specialist, is held in equal stakes by Great Hill Partners and Nordic Capital since March 2024 [A, own release]. The consumer-side consolidator is under an FTC order. doxo, a Seattle bill-pay app that says it reaches 'over 120,000 billers' and 'over 10 million people' [C], agreed in August 2026 to pay $2.1M to settle FTC allegations that it used 'misleading search ads to impersonate consumers' billers' and added undisclosed 'delivery fees' [A, FTC]. That is a warning about the one model that does not need the biller's consent. Pricing is the convenience fee, and scale wins it. Paymentus says it is paid transaction fees 'directly from billers, financial institutions, partners or, in some cases, from consumers as a convenience fee', and that its gross margin falls as it adds 'large, high-volume enterprise billers with lower margins' because card interchange is its main cost [A]. ACI's Biller revenue rose $91.2M in FY2025 while cash operating expense rose $81.7M, 'primarily for payment card interchange and other processing fees' [A]. The economics are a thin spread on interchange that rewards volume, and FIS advertises a 'dynamic and compliant surcharge program' as a feature [A, product sheet]. Incumbent vulnerability decides it. The incumbents are not weak: the largest pure-play grew revenue 37% in a year and is profitable, the next one is a $818M segment of a public payments company, and Fiserv and FIS sell the same product to billers alongside their bank businesses. Each acquisition in the last four years has folded a challenger into a larger book. A new entrant would sell to a regulated biller through an RFP, integrate to its CIS or policy system, and then compete on a fee where the incumbent's interchange volume sets the price.
The thesis behind this category is true, and the proof is on EDGAR — which is exactly why it is a bad place for a new entrant. Toast's FY2025 10-K (year ended 2025-12-31) reports financial technology solutions revenue of $5,037M against subscription services revenue of $936M, on $195.1B of gross payment volume [A]. Payments is 5.4x the software line by revenue and still bigger by gross profit — $1,146M from fintech against $672M from subscriptions, computed from the 10-K's own cost-of-revenue table — even though the fintech margin is about 23% against 72% for software. AppFolio shows the same shape in property management: Value Added Services (electronic payments, tenant screening, risk mitigation) $721.5M against subscription services $211.5M in FY2025 [A]. The atlas's own vertical records reach the same answer from the other side: payments and insurance attach decides self-storage (Storable), marina (DockMaster Payments, Storable Marine), salon (Fresha at zero subscription), medspa (Boulevard, Zenoti) and field-service (Jobber, Housecall Pro) — all of them treat the licence as the cheap part. But the value flows to the software company that owns the merchant, not to the rail it rents. The infrastructure layer underneath is held by two giants. Stripe says businesses on it generated $1.9 trillion of volume in 2025, up 34%, and priced a tender offer at $159B (newsroom, 2026-02-24) [B]. Adyen reported FY2025 net revenue of EUR 2,364.2M on EUR 1,394.3B processed, with issuing volumes up 8x as platforms embedded cards (H2 2025 results, 2026-02-12) [A]. Below them the processors bought their way in: FIS bought Payrix in 2022, and Global Payments completed its purchase of Worldpay on 2026-01-12, serving more than 6 million merchant locations on $3.7 trillion of volume with an 'Integrated & Platforms' channel [A, 8-K]. The venture-funded challengers are small next to that and are selling the same thing: Finix (over $208M raised, Series C led by Acrew), Rainforest ($57.5M, Series B led by Matrix and Infinity Ventures, 2025-09-08), Tilled (nearly $40M), Infinicept ($23M growth round, 2022), Moov ($77.5M). Each one positions itself as cheaper or more vertical-friendly than Stripe — Rainforest's model is a consumption-based cut of each transaction with no platform fee [B] — which means the wedge is price, paid for out of a thin interchange margin. The adjacent layers (BaaS: Unit $169.6M, Treasury Prime ~$73M; embedded lending: Parafin $194M; embedded payroll: Check, $75M Series C led by Stripe) last raised in 2021-24 and none has announced a larger round since in the coverage opened here. An entrant needs a sponsor bank, card-network registration, underwriting and risk reserves before earning its first basis point, then has to win platforms that can renegotiate or switch processors once their volume is large. Entry cost and regulatory drag decide it. The money in this theme is earned by building the vertical software and attaching one of these rails — the right move for a Research Upon vertical, not a market to enter as the rail.
Three disclosed lines — SS&C at $6.27B, FIS Capital Markets at $3.20B and Broadridge's technology-and-operations recurring book at $1.92B — put a floor above $11B on this market, and every dollar of it sits behind clearing-house certification, SOC and regulatory audit. Entry is a multi-year certification programme before revenue, which is the wrong shape for a small team.
The moat here is legal as well as commercial: credit ratings used for regulatory capital purposes must come from a designated agency (NRSRO in the US, equivalent recognition elsewhere), and that designation is not obtainable by a startup. The adjacent data and analytics businesses are defended by decades of accumulated proprietary history that cannot be back-filled. This is the clearest example in this research of a market where the barrier is a licence somebody else already holds. Sourced update: S&P Global's Market Intelligence segment alone is a $4.92B business and Moody's Analytics is now 97% recurring — an entrant is not selling data into a gap but into two subscription estates that already own the workflow.
Every layer of this market already has a regulated-grade incumbent, and the layer that was open in 2020 — machine-learning pricing — has been funded and then partly absorbed by the core-system owners. Life and long-duration valuation (IFRS 17, which took effect for annual periods beginning on or after 1 January 2023 [A], and the US LDTI standard) runs on FIS Insurance Risk Suite – Prophet, Milliman's Integrate/MG-ALFA and WTW's actuarial software; these models sit inside the appointed actuary's sign-off, so OSFI's IFRS 17 memoranda to appointed actuaries (November 2022) [A] are effectively a list of reasons not to change engines. Catastrophe modelling is a two-firm market of public-company units: Verisk says it 'pioneered the field of probabilistic catastrophe modeling' with models in 120+ countries and territories [A], and Moody's paid about $2 billion for RMS in 2021 [B]; Moody's Analytics now reports $685m of Insurance revenue (2025, +15%) [A] and Verisk $2.18B of Underwriting revenue (2025) [A], which also covers ISO's loss costs and rating rules across 32 lines [A]. The challengers are real and well funded: Akur8 ($180m raised, $120m Series C led by One Peak in 2024, with Guidewire as an investor) [B] bought Milliman's Arius reserving software (2024) and Slope Software's life modelling platform (March 2026) [B], so it now spans P&C pricing, reserving and life valuation; hyperexponential ($91m: $18m Series A, $73m Series B led by Battery Ventures) [B] owns commercial and specialty pricing; Earnix ($75m in 2021 at a $1B pre-money, led by Insight Partners) [B] won Canada's Definity for personal auto and property pricing in May 2026 [C]; Federato (over $180m, $100m Series D led by Goldman Sachs Alternatives, November 2025) [B] sells the underwriting workbench and now calls itself an AI-native core system [C]. And the core vendors are closing the gap from below: Guidewire bought Poland's Quantee in April 2025 [A] and InsuranceSuite now lists PricingCenter and an agentic UnderwritingCenter as core applications [A] (FY2026 revenue $1.48B [A]); Duck Creek, private under Vista since a $2.6B take-private in 2023 [B], sells its own rating and analytics. How this differs from its neighbours: 5241 Insurance Carrier Core Systems is policy, billing and claims — the system of record; this record is the actuarial and pricing brain that sits beside it and is bought by the chief actuary and underwriting heads, not the CIO. 524210 is the broker's agency management system. 5239 Financial Data & Credit Analytics is ratings and credit data (the other half of Moody's and S&P). 5261 is the pension fund as a buyer of investment services. Incumbent vulnerability decides it: the buyers are a few hundred regulated carriers with actuarial sign-off risk, the platforms they trust are public-company units or $100m+-funded specialists, and the one open seam — modern pricing — is being folded into Guidewire's core.
Policy administration, billing and claims for a carrier is the insurance equivalent of a core banking replacement: multi-year, regulator-visible, and undertaken about once a generation. Guidewire's 25–30% share of Tier 1 and 2 carriers rests on that replacement cycle rather than on product superiority, and the mid-market is already contested by a Vista-backed Duck Creek and two international challengers. Distinct from the broker-side study at 524210 — different buyer, different system, an order of magnitude more capital.
The pain is real and documented; the customer base is shrinking and the transaction volume driving the wedge is declining 5.1% year over year. A hated incumbent is not the same as a vulnerable one.
And what every business buys · 33 generic categories
Sold to every industry rather than this one, so they are filed against the software industry's own code. The same few vendors recur across most of them.
Companies in this industry · 169
Every company this research names that is filed here or beneath — the operators, and the vendors that sell to them — largest disclosed revenue first. The rank is within the company’s own six-digit industry.
| Company | Filed under | Revenue | Rank |
|---|---|---|---|
| Arthur J. GallagherPrivate | Insurance agencies and brokerages524210 | $13.9B | 1/16 |
| CoinbaseNADAQ:COIN | Securities and commodity exchanges5232 | $7.2B | 1/19 |
| SS&CNASDAQ:SSNC | Securities and commodity contracts intermediation and brokerage5231 | $6.3B | 1/6 |
| Brown & BrownPrivate | Insurance agencies and brokerages524210 | $5.9B | 2/16 |
| NICENASDAQ:NICE | Activities related to credit intermediation5223 | $2.9B | 1/7 |
| ICE Mortgage TechnologyPrivate | Non-depository credit intermediation5222 | $2.2B | 1/20 |
| GuidewireNYSE:GWRE | Insurance carriers5241 | $1.4B | 1/19 |
| TMX GroupTSX:X | Securities and commodity exchanges5232 | $1.7B | 2/19 |
| PaymentusPrivate | Financial transactions processing, reserve and clearing house activities52232 | $1.2B | 1/11 |
| UpstartPrivate | Non-depository credit intermediation5222 | $1.0B | 2/20 |
| Q2NYSE:QTWO | Depository credit intermediation5221 | $795M | 1/33 |
| nCinoNCNO | Non-depository credit intermediation5222 | $595M | 3/20 |
| AlkamiPrivate | Non-depository credit intermediation5222 | $444M | 4/20 |
| RobinhoodPrivate | Securities and commodity exchanges5232 | $354M | 3/19 |
| RiskifiedPrivate | Depository credit intermediation5221 | $345M | 2/33 |
And 154 more on the companies page.
Who works here
The occupations employed in Finance and insurance, most concentrated in it first. The share is measured against the whole sector, not this industry — the published cross-tabulation stops there.
Tagged to this industry
Concentrated in this sectorA
These jobs are mostly done here. An operator in this industry is competing for them against others in the same industry, not against the whole economy.
And the jobs every business has
Found across at least fourteen of the twenty sectors. In a small establishment several of these are usually one person, or an outside provider.
Inside this industry
5 rows sit directly beneath 52, and 96 in all once every level is counted. Each has a base report of its own.